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THE PERMUTATION PRINCIPLE 
IN QUANTIFICATIONAL LOGIC’ 
The story goes back to 1940, with the publication of Quine’s Mathematical 
Logic [5]. He there presents a system of quantificational logic in which only 
sentences or closed formulas are theorems. In that system, the sole rule of 
inference is Modus Ponens and the axioms are the universal closures of the 
following formulas: 
(1) $, for @ tautologous; 
(2) Wvb) 1 vcwv~~); 
(3) qb 3 Vcuj, for o not free in 4; 
(4) VCY~(LY) > I#@), with usual restrictions; 
(5) vdv@p 3 v’pvcv#J . 
Suppose the variables, in alphabetic order, are x1, x2, . . . . Then Quine 
takes the universal closure of a formula I#J to be the result of prefixing the 
quantifiers Va, for (II free in 9, to that formula in their reverse of anti-alpha- 
betic order. 
The presence of the Permutation Principle (5) somewhat mars the 
elegance of the system; but Berry [l] was able to show how to do without 
it. Alter the definition of closure: prefer the universal quantifiers in their 
alphabetic, not their anti-alphabetic, order. The change is small and seeming- 
ly insignificant. But taking as axioms the alphabetic closures of (l)-(4) 
suffices to prove all theorems of the original system, including Permutation. 
This change was incorporated into the second edition of Mathematical 
Logic [6]. But the question remained as to whether it was essential Could 
axiom-scheme (5) also be dropped from the original system without any loss 
of theorems? 
The answer is no. Let us define a certain transform (@)’ of a formula 9. 
Call the universal formula Vo$ non-vacuous if 01 occurs free in $. Given a 
subformula occurrence $ of 4, say that $ is bound in $ if a free variable (Y 
of J, is bound by a quantifier Va outside of J/ but in 4. Now call the sub- 
formula occurrence I) of $ replaceable if(i) it is a non-vacuous formula of 
the form Vx, x (note the specific variable), (ii) it is bound in 4, and (iii) it is 
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not a proper subformula of any other formula satisfying (i) and (ii). Then 
we may defme the transform (4)’ of 4 to be the result of replacing all 
replaceable subformula occurrences in @ with 1. 
Let Q be Quine’s original system and let Q- be the result of dropping 
axiom-scheme (5) from Q. Then it may be shown by an induction on proofs 
that: 
LEMMA 1. For any theorem # of Q-, the transform (r$)’ is classically valid. 
Consider now the formula 4=Vxl VxzFxlx2 > Vx2Vxl Fxlx2. Then 
its transform (4)’ is Vxi Vx2 Fxl x2 1 Vx21, which is not classically valid. 
It therefore follows from Lemma 1 that 
THEOREM 2. The formula Vxl Vx2 Fxl x2 1 ‘ix2 Vxl Fxl x2 is not a 
theorem of Q-, and hence the axiom-scheme (5) is not redundant in the 
original system Q. 
It should be clear that the non-derivability of many other instances of 
the scheme could be established in the same way. 
Although the above formula 4 is not derivable within Q-, the formula 
Vx2 ‘dxs Fx2xJ > Vx, Vx2 Fx2xj is. Indeed, given any formula $, let $J”, 
for n 2 0, be the result of replacing each variable Xi in @ with x, + i. Then 
it may be shown by an easy induction that if 4 is a theorem of Q then 9” 
is a theorem of Q- for some nonnegative integer n; though whether 4” is 
derivable for a particular n would seem to depend upon the availability of 
variables alphabetically earlier to those appearing in $ in a way that is hard 
precisely to determine. 
This observation has a curious consequence in regard to the completeness 
of Q-. The original system Q is complete; each valid sentence is a theorem. 
The defective system Q- is not complete, since instances of Permutation 
are not derivable. However, Q- is complete up to relettering of variables. 
Given any valid sentence 9, $J is derivable within Q and hence an alphabetic 
variant $” of Q is derivable within Q-. 
The story now goes to 1963, with the publication of papers by Kripke 
[2] and Lambert [3]. Kripke was concerned to block the derivation of the 
Barcan formula or its converse within a quantified version of the modal 
logic SS. He was able to do this by requiring, as in Quine [6], that only 
closed formulas be theorems. However, because he wished to dispense with 
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the rule of necessitation and because he also wished to allow for the empty 
domain, he did not quite take Qume’s revised system as the quantificational 
basis for his modal logic. Instead, he made two changes. First, he loosened 
up the definition of universal closure. He did not require of a universal 
closure Vor Voz . . . Va,, cp of p that the quantifiers Va, , Vu,, . . . , ‘da,, 
be prefixed in any particular order or that their variables or, (~2, . . . , err be 
free; he only required that the resulting formula Val ‘f/a2 . . . ‘da, cp be 
closed. Second, he took as his axioms the closures, in this sense, of (1) (2) 
and (3) and the following variant of (4): 
(4)’ ‘dp(Vrwq(cx) > (p@)), with usual restrictions. 
Quite independently, Lambert d ev el oped a similar system. Like Kripke, 
he was concerned to allow for the empty domain; but he also wished to 
allow for theorems with free variables. He therefore proposed, in effect, that 
the formulas (l), (2), (3) and (4) themselves be axioms (not their closures) 
and that both Modus Ponens and Generalization be taken as the rules of 
inference. To these axioms and rules, he then considered the result of 
adding the standard classical axioms for identity. 
As later became clear, Lambert’s full system (with identity) is complete 
for its intended interpretation. But it was then generally assumed that this 
system without its identity axioms and the corresponding quantificational 
part of Kripke’s system (which had not been formulated with identity in the 
first place) were also complete. Indeed, in their paper [4] of 1970, Leblanc 
and Meyer gave a metalogical investigation of the Lambert fragment in 
which it was presupposed that Permutation and related principles were 
derivable; and, in [2], Kripke claimed completeness for his full modal 
system, which would have entailed completeness for its quantificational 
fragment. But then, Lambert pointed out, in a letter to Meyer of around 
1968-9, the difficulty of deriving Permutation within the identity-free part 
of his system; and independently, in his paper of 1970 (171, p. 286, fn. 6), 
Trew pointed to the related difficulty of deriving Permutation within 
Kripke’s system. The problem of deriving the principle became open and, at 
least within the world of free logicians, achieved some notoriety. 
It now appears that Permutation is not derivable within these systems. 
To see this, we construct a somewhat devious semantics for quantificational 
logic. Assume, for simplicity, that dyadic F is the sole predicate in our 
language. Let a sensitive model M for that language be a quadruple 
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(A, R, f, g), where A (domain) is a non-empty set, R (extension of F) is a 
subset of A x A, and both fand g are functions from A into P(A), satisfying 
the conditions that &f(a) and &g(a) for all aEA. The pair (A, R) may 
be regarded as a classical model. What fand g add to this model are relation- 
ships of dependence in the assignment of values. If, in the formula Fo& a 
has been assigned to (Y, then only b from f(a) can be assigned to /I (for the 
formula Fo$ to be satisfied by the resulting assignment); and likewise, if b 
has been assigned to 0, only CI form g(b) can be assigned to (Y. 
We make this idea precise as follows. Let M = (A, R, f, g) be a sensitive 
model. Add all objects of A to the language as names of themselves. Let the 
standard substitution $“/a of a for Q! in $J, with aEA, be the result of 
replacing all free occurrences of cr in 4 with a. Let the deviant substitution 
#“/a be obtained from the standard substitution cp”/cr in two complemen- 
tary steps. First, put 1 for all those occurrences of Fab in cp”/o that come 
from Fob in cp upon replacing the free occurrence of (Y in Fob with II and 
for which bEA but a$g(b); let the result be J/. Now put 1 for all those 
occurrences of Fba in J/ that come from Fba in cp upon replacing the free 
occurrence of (II in Fbo with a and for which bEA but a 8 f(b). 
Define deviant truth by the following clauses: 
(9 Ml=Fab iff(a,b)ER; 
(ii) M k -f#~ iff not M I= 9; 
(iii) Ml=(@Vti)iffMl=@orMi=ti; 
64 M~v~diffM~z~~foralla~A. 
Say that a formula @ is true in M if the result of substituting any elements 
of A for the free variables of 4 is true in M. 
It may now be shown by a tedious induction on proofs that: 
LEMMA 3. All the theorems of Lambert’s system, and hence of Kripke’s 
system too, are true in any sensitive model. 
It is instructive to see why the proof breaks down for the systems with 
identity. Take the identity axiom cp = V&yVfl(a = fl> (For7 1 Ffiy)), 
for cr, /3 and 7 distinct variables. Then relative to the model M above, 
Cp ‘,‘o’]yy/I = (1 = 1 >(F 10 >I)) and hence is false. 
Consider now the following sensitive model M = (A, R, f; g) : 
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A = {O,l}; R=AxA; f@)=fU)=A; 
g(O)={O}andg(l)={l}. 
Take distinct variables (Y and /3. Then M b VcxVflFc& since Fc$yay/3 = Fab 
for all a, b EA. On the other hand, My VflVcuF@, since Fc$#~Q = 1. 
From this and Lemma 3 follows the conclusion to our story: 
THEOREM 4. The sentence VcJ@FOg 1 V/3V’arF@3, for CY distinct from /3, 
is not derivable within the systems of Kripke and of Lambert. 
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